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1 Introduction
The consensus view among academic economists and policymakers is that, once
monetary authorities have chartered an optimal course to pursue purely domestic
objectives, there is little to be gained from explicit coordination of monetary policy
at the international level. The international monetary policy compact that follows
from this consensus view is encapsulated in the maxim “keep your house in order.”1
Starting in the 1980s, a vast body of research in open economy macro has lent the-
oretical support to this maxim, suggesting that, from a social welfare point of view,
if each country could keep its house in order, the global economy would come ar-
bitrarily close to an equilibrium in which policymakers commit to coordinate their
policies optimally.2 As noted by Taylor (2013) in relation to the Great Moderation
period, “[...] policies were executed under a basic understanding that the outcome
would be nearly as good as if countries coordinated their policy choices in a cooper-
ative fashion.” But the open macro literature that underpins this view draws on a
much stronger theoretical result that there is virtually no welfare cost in switching
from cooperative to non-cooperative policies. This is to say, the forceful pursuit of
nationally-oriented monetary policy beyond current practice—e.g., beyond flexible
inflation targeting—should have virtually no consequences on global stabilization
and welfare, no matter how aggressively other countries engage in retaliatory mea-
sures. Can this theoretical tenet be trusted to provide reliable guidance for policy
assessment and design?
We revisit the theory of international monetary cooperation using the same
workhorse open economy macro model that has provided the analytical backbone.
The key difference between our analysis and the analysis in previous papers is that
we assess systematically how the gains from cooperation depend on and evolve dy-
namically with prevailing economic conditions. Departing from the literature, we
show that international spillovers and gains from cooperation are small when global
1This view is articulated in detail by Svensson (2003) and Svensson (2010b), which characterize flexible
inflation targeting as best practice monetary policy followed by many central banks. At different times, the
maxim was reaffirmed by Jerome Powell, the current chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, see
Federal Reserve Board (2019), as well by his predecessors Janet Yellen, for instance see The Brookings Insitution
(2019), and Ben Bernanke, for instance in Bernanke (2017).
2 For instance, see Sachs and Oudiz (1984), Taylor (1985), Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Pappa (2004).
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imbalances are modest, whereas policymakers may be tempted to pursue purely na-
tional objectives more and more forcefully when imbalances grow, leading to sizable
foreign spillovers. With large imbalances, the distance between cooperative and non-
cooperative policies widens, as the reaction of foreign policymakers may lead to re-
verberations that can shift the equilibrium far from the allocations under cooperative
policies or under regimes of implicit cooperation, such as flexible inflation targeting.
The economic conditions relevant for our argument depend on which financial and
real distortions prevail in the economy, but a common thread is that following re-
alistic economic developments, the cost of pursuing purely domestic objectives can
rise to multiple times the cost of business cycles.
The model we use has standard features. The world consists of two countries,
each specialized in the production of one good that is traded internationally and is
an imperfect substitute for the good produced abroad. Both prices and wages are
sticky, creating tradeoffs for monetary policy even in the face of technology shocks.
We consider alternative financial market arrangements across countries, including
incomplete markets with only two non-state contingent bonds alternatively parame-
terized to include or exclude valuation effects of nominal exchange rate movements,
a complete set of Arrow-Debreu securities, and autarky.3 Apart from the addi-
tion of sticky wages and the broader range of financial market arrangements, our
model closely follows Benigno and Benigno (2006), and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc
(2010). Like these authors, we consider cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria
with Ramsey optimal strategies for monetary policy. We assume that prices are
sticky in the producer’s currency, which implies full passthrough of exchange rate
movements to export prices. In sensitivity analysis we consider local- and dominant-
currency-pricing which limit the passthrough of exchange rate movements to import
prices faced by consumers.4
Based on this model, we compute the dynamic evolution of the economy under
cooperation over a finite but large number of periods, which allows us to characterize
3The static model in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) featured only sticky wages and either financial autarky or a
case in which terms of trade movements render financial market arrangements irrelevant as in Cole and Obstfeld
(1991).
4Gopinath, Boz, Casas, Diez, Gourinchas, and Plagborg-Moller (2019) document the empirical relevance of
dominant-currency-pricing.
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the distribution of the variables in the model. Drawing economic conditions from this
(dynamically endogenous) distribution, we assess the gains from cooperation relative
to non-cooperative behavior. This method allows us to condition our welfare analysis
on states of the economy that may be more or less likely, according to the model
itself, identifying the key variables and tradeoffs that drive our results.
We show that the relevant variables and tradeoffs crucially vary with the struc-
ture of international financial markets. When financial markets across countries are
incomplete, we find that the critical state variable is the net-foreign-asset position.
Along paths with wider imbalances, the creditor country has a higher consumption
profile and correspondingly lower marginal utility of consumption. Accordingly, the
cooperative policy enhances overall welfare by compressing the creditor’s consump-
tion and expanding the debtor’s. Without cooperation, the creditor country can use
unanticipated deflation and an exchange rate appreciation to boost its consumption
and leisure, something that the creditor will do as long as the perceived gains do not
exceed the associated utility loss from changes on price and wage inflation. In turn,
as the debtor country leans against the creditor’s appreciation with deflation of its
own, a competitive cycle arises, which can lead to large efficiency losses.
When international financial markets are complete, however, each country can
insure against inflation movements in the other country, and global imbalances no
longer motivate strategic monetary measures. Nonetheless, national policymakers
may still face significant tradeoffs between stabilizing output and inflation. Just as
under incomplete markets the gains from cooperation increase as net-foreign-asset
positions grow, under complete markets the gains from cooperation increase with the
distance of the real wage in either country from its steady-state value. Intuitively,
the real wage maintains an imprint of how the cooperative policy affects relative
production, consumption, and inflation levels across countries along the evolution
of the global economy: at any point in time, the real wage reflects how cooperative
policies have traded-off different objectives in the past. The farther the real wage is
from its steady-state level, the greater is the potential mismatch between cooperative
and nationally-oriented policies. Drawing transition points from the distribution
generated by the model allows us to characterize the distribution of the costs of self-
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oriented national policies and to show that they can exceed the costs of economic
fluctuations.
A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that, for the first time, we offer an
assessment of the incentives to deviate unilaterally from cooperation. By contrast,
previous papers stopped after characterizing the equilibrium of the competitive game.
To analyze the deviation incentives, we set up a two-stage game. In the first stage
of the game, each country chooses its preferences to be either exclusively focused on
the welfare of its residents, or encompassing the welfare of the residents of the other
country. In the second stage, the two countries play an open-loop Nash game that
determines the welfare of each country, given the actions selected at the first stage and
conditional on the transition point. We find that the gains from unilateral deviations
from cooperation at the first stage of the game are influenced by the same prevailing
economic conditions that magnify the gains from cooperation. Accordingly, our
results indicate that cooperation is more fragile exactly when it is more advantageous.
In our baseline analysis, we follow the literature, contrasting the case of full co-
operation with (open-loop) non-cooperative strategies under commitment. As men-
tioned at the beginning of this text, however, national central banks have the man-
date to achieve a small set of nationally-oriented objectives such as domestic price
stability and full resource utilization, not to coordinate their policies in support of
economic conditions in foreign countries.5 Much in line with the comment by Taylor
(2013), we show that, in the workhorse model we use, a regime of non-cooperative
flexible inflation targeting can support an equilibrium that is close to the one un-
der a regime of full cooperation, despite its sole focus on domestic inflation and
output. But for this very reason, under the economic conditions discussed above,
the incentives to deviate from flexible inflation targeting towards aggressive policies
that reflect national objectives are just as strong as the incentives to deviate from
full cooperation. In this respect, our analysis moves well beyond Taylor’s and the
literature characterization of the properties of inward-looking policies.
Our model is related to (and in some cases encompasses) key contributions in
the literature which either lend support to, or express criticism of the consensus
5 See Svensson (2010a) and Reis (2013) for reviews of mandates for central banks.
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view.6 For instance, in specifications of our model in which country-specific mone-
tary policy tradeoffs are small, with financial autarky for example, our results are
close to those of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002). A critical reassessment of the litera-
ture is offered by Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005) who also point out the gains
from cooperation can become more sizable than in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) in a
model with a non-tradeable sector and sector-specific technology shocks. Nonethe-
less the gains they report remain negligible relative to the cost of business cycles.
Rabitsch (2012), stresses the importance of different financial arrangements in shap-
ing the costs of abandoning cooperative policies. Relatedly, Banerjee, Devereux, and
Lombardo (2016) consider a model with financial frictions. None of these authors
condition the welfare analysis on dynamic economic developments. By focusing on
the steady states of their models, these authors only uncover small welfare differ-
ences between cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria. By contrast, our results
show that, under reasonable and empirically relevant calibrations of the model, the
costs of abandoning cooperative policies evolve dynamically and can become quanti-
tatively important, as do the incentives to move towards nationally-oriented policies.
A convincing assessment of these costs and incentives can only be conditional on this
evolution, emphasizing the need for an approach that moves away from steady-state
analysis.
Other closely related papers include Korinek (2017), which presents a First Wel-
fare Theorem for open economies, spelling out conditions on the interactions between
policymakers, policy instruments and financial markets that need to be violated to
open up any role for cooperation. His work and ours are complementary. A no-
table paper is by Benigno and Benigno (2006), who emphasize that the conditions
under which nationally-oriented policies have no costs are actually quite restrictive—
without however highlighting the channels that lead to their dynamic evolution and
without pursuing a quantitative analysis.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, and the
cooperative, non-cooperative policies, including flexible inflation targeting. Section 3
showcases the strategic interactions implied by non-cooperative policies and describes
6 Early contributions include Hamada (1976) and Canzoneri and Henderson (1991).
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the analytical framework we use to dissect them. Section 4 presents our results
under incomplete markets with a symmetric portfolio of international bonds setup
to exclude valuation effects. It sizes the welfare gains from cooperation, the cost
of business cycles, the incentives to deviate from cooperative strategies, the Pareto
efficiency gains, and the incentives to deviate from policies that are consistent with
implicit cooperation. Section 5 looks into valuation effects linked to asymmetric
international bond portfolios, into exchange rate passthrough, and into alternative
sources of economic fluctuations. Section 6 highlights alternative economic conditions
that shape the gains from cooperations under complete financial markets or under
financial autarky. Section 7 concludes.
2 Economic Environment
The analysis builds on a standard two-country two-goods New Keynesian model
similar to those in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002),
Benigno and Benigno (2006), and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2010).
2.1 Model Setup
A continuum of agents of mass 1 lives in each of two equal-sized countries. In the
baseline model, exports are denominated in the currency of the exporting country
(producer-currency-pricing), prices and wages are sticky as in Calvo (1983), interna-
tional financial markets are incomplete, and shocks to total factor productivity are
the only source of uncertainty. In the following brief description of the model, given
the symmetry of the setup, we focus on country 1, the home country. Appendix A
offers more details on the model and describes the extensions we study as sensitiv-
ity analysis, including local-currency-pricing, dominant-currency-pricing, complete
international financial markets, and financial autarky.
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2.1.1 Households
The intertemporal preferences of the representative household in country 1, the home
country, are
U1,t = Et
∞∑
j=0
βjU1,t, (1)
where U1,t = ln (C1,t+j − κC1,t+j−1)−
χ0
1 + χ
L1+χ1,t+j . (2)
The felicity function U1,t depends on current and lagged consumption C1,t as well
as hours worked L1,t. In line with the New Keynesian literature, the economy is
cashless and abstracts from the utility component of money.
The household maximizes intertemporal utility given the budget constraint
P c1,tC1,t +
1
φb1,t
{
P b1,tB11,t + e1,tP
b
2,tB12,t
}
+
∫
S
PD1,t+1|tD1,t+1|t
= W1,tL1,t +B11,t−1 + e1,tB12,t−1 +D1,t|t−1 + T1,t. (3)
The difference between nominal consumption expenditures, P c1,tC1,t, and nominal
wage and non-wage income,W1,tL1,t and T1,t respectively, is accounted for by trade in
and holdings of financial assets. In detail, households have access to state-contingent
bonds D1,t+1|t that only trade within the country at price P
D
1,t+1|t. In addition, house-
holds trade two non-state-contingent bonds of different currency denomination in the
international financial market. The bonds are held/issued in fixed proportions
ηB11,t = (1− η)e1,tB12,t. (4)
When setting η = 0.5, half of the net-foreign-asset (NFA) position of country 1
consists of the bond denominated in the currency of country 1, B11,t, and the other
half denominated in the currency of country 2, B12,t. When setting η = 0, only the
bond denoted in the currency of country 1 is traded, yielding an asymmetry when
solving our model. Finally, households face a small intermediation cost φb1,t that is a
function of the NFA position (relative to the size of the economy). This cost ensures
that the distribution of the NFA position is stationary in our simulations.
8
Perfectly competitive distributors assemble the final consumption basket C1,t from
the home and (imported) foreign manufactured goods, Cd1,t and M1,t, respectively.
The distributors solve the cost minimization problem
min
Cd
1,t,M1,t
P d1,tC
d
1,t + P
m
1,tM1,t
s.t.
C1,t =
(
(ωc)
ρc
1+ρc
(
Cd1,t
) 1
1+ρc + (1− ωc)
ρc
1+ρc (M1,t)
1
1+ρc
)1+ρc
, (5)
where the price of the imported good, Pm1,t, equals its price in the foreign country
times the nominal exchange rate, etP
d
2,t.
2.1.2 Price and Wage Phillips Curves
Households supply L1,t units of labor services to labor unions. The unions, indexed
by h, introduce distinguishing characteristics to household labor to produce L1,t(h),
before selling it to labor bundlers as in Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000). These
bundlers are perfectly competitive and combine the labor services from the unions
into the labor service Ld1,t according to L
d
1,t =
[∫ 1
0
L1,t(h)
1
1+θw dh
]1+θw
. They sell these
services at wage W1,t to intermediate goods producers.
The monopolistically competitive unions take the real wage desired by households,
W˜1,t/P1,t, as the cost of labor and set nominal wages as in Calvo (1983). Each period,
with probability 1− ξw, a union gets to adjust its wage W1,t(h) optimally; otherwise,
a union adjusts its wage by the steady-state inflation rate, Π¯. The union solves
max
W1,t(h)
Et
∞∑
j=0
(ξw)jΛ1,t+j
[
(1 + τw)Π¯jW1,t(h)− W˜1,t+j
]
L1,t+j(h) (6)
s.t.
L1,t(h) =
[
W1,t(h)
W1,t
]− 1+θw
θw
Ld1,t, (7)
where the stochastic discount factor, Λ1,t+j , is such that Λ1,t+j = β
j MU1,t+j
MU1,t
and where
MU1,t is the marginal utility of consumption. Equation (7) relates the bundlers’
demand for the union’s labor to the union’s wage W1,t(h). The subsidy τ
w makes
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the level of the labor supply efficient in the steady state.
We model sticky nominal prices analogously. Monopolistically competitive firms
produce differentiated varieties using a linear technology
Y1,t(i) = exp (z1,t)L
d
1,t(i), (8)
where z1,t is the country-wide technology shock. The term L
d
1,t(i) is the demand of
firm i for the aggregate labor services Ld1,t implying marginal production costs of
W1,t/ exp (z1,t). Competitive bundlers combine the varieties into the home manu-
factured good according to Y d1,t =
[∫ 1
0
Y1,t (i)
1
1+θp di
]1+θp
and sell it at the price P d1,t
domestically and at the price P d1,t/et abroad.
Variety producers set nominal prices as in Calvo (1983). Each period, a pro-
ducer adjusts its price P1,t(i) with fixed with probability 1 − ξ
p optimally and with
probability ξp by the steady-state inflation rate Π¯. A producer solves
max
P1,t(i),{Y1,t+j(i)}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
j=0
(ξp)jΛ1,t+j
(
(1 + τ p) Π¯jP1,t(i)−
W1,t+j
exp (z1,t+j)
)
Y1,t+j(i)
s.t.
Y1,t+j(i) =
[
P1,t+j(i)
P d1,t+j
]− 1+θp
θp
Y d1,t+j . (9)
Equation (9) relates the demand by the bundlers for variety i, Y1,t+j(i), to the price
of the variety, P1,t(i). The sales subsidy τ
p is set to eliminate the relative price
distortions due to monopolistic competition in the deterministic steady state.
2.1.3 Market Clearing
Market clearing in the factor and goods markets implies
L1,t =
∫ 1
0
L1,t(h)dh (10)
and
Y d1,t = C
d
1,t +M2,t, (11)
10
where M2,t denotes the demand of the foreign country for the domestic good.
Finally, domestically traded bonds are in zero net supply, requiring D1,t+1|t = 0.
For internationally traded bonds, market clearing requires
B11,t +B21,t = 0, (12)
B12,t +B22,t = 0. (13)
2.2 Monetary Policy
Monetary policymakers in each country set the path of their respective policy in-
strument, i1,t and i2,t, to optimize their assigned objective function subject to the
optimality and market clearing conditions associated with the model as detailed in
Appendix A. The optimality and market clearing conditions are summarized by
Etg(x˜t−1, x˜t, x˜t+1, i1,t, i2,t, ζt) = 0, (14)
where x˜t are the (N − 2)× 1 vector of endogenous variables excluding policy instru-
ments and ζt are the exogenous shocks. The objective functions differ between the
cooperative and the non-cooperative policy game, as detailed below.
2.2.1 Cooperative Policies
In the cooperative game, the policymakers maximize global welfare defined as the
weighted average of the utility of the representative households in the two countries,
ωU1,t + (1− ω)U2,t, under full commitment
max
{x˜t,i1,t,i2,t}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [ωU1(x˜t−1, x˜t, ζt) + (1− ω)U2(x˜t−1, x˜t, ζt)] ,
s.t.
Etg(x˜t−1, x˜t, x˜t+1, i1,t, i2,t, ζt) = 0. (15)
We refer to the monetary policies associated with the cooperative game as “cooper-
ative policies.”
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2.2.2 Non-cooperative or Nationally-Oriented Policies
We model the non-cooperative interactions between policymakers in different coun-
tries as an open-loop Nash game. Let {ij,t,−t∗}
∞
t=0 denote the sequence of policy
choices by player j = [1, 2] before and after, but not including period t∗. An open-
loop Nash equilibrium is a sequence
{
i∗j,t
}∞
t=0
with the property that for all t∗, i∗j,t∗
maximizes player j′s objective function subject to the structural equations of the
economy in Equation (14) for given sequences
{
i∗j,t,−t∗
}∞
t=0
and
{
i∗−j,t
}∞
t=0
, where{
i∗−j,t
}∞
t=0
denotes the sequence of policy moves by the other player. Each player’s
action is the best response to the other players’ best responses.
With policymakers needing to specify a complete contingent plan at time 0 for
their respective instrument variable, we can recast each player’s optimization problem
as an optimal control problem given the policies of the other player
max
{x˜t,ij,t}∞t=0
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUj(x˜t−1, x˜t, ζt),
s.t.
Etg(x˜t−1, x˜t, x˜t+1, i1,t, i2,t, ζt) = 0
for given {i−j,t}
∞
t=0. (16)
We refer to the monetary policies associated with the non-cooperative game as
“nationally-oriented policies.”
2.2.3 Keep-your-house-in-order Policies
The objective function of the policymakers need not coincide with the utility func-
tions of the representative households. Using the general loss function Lj , we modify
the non-cooperative game in Section 2.2.2 to be
max
{x˜t,ij,t}∞t=0
−E0
∞∑
t=0
βtLj(x˜t−1, x˜t, ζt),
s.t.
Etg(x˜t−1, x˜t, x˜t+1, i1,t, i2,t, ζt) = 0
for given {i−j,t}
∞
t=0. (17)
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Following Svensson (2003), we capture flexible inflation targeting with the simple
loss function
Lj = wpi(pi
4
j,ct − p¯i
4)2 + wy(y
gap
j,t )
2, (18)
where pi4j,ct denotes annualized consumption price inflation and y
gap
j,t the output gap
in country j.7
2.3 Parameterization and Solution Method
The model parameters are reported in Table 1. While most of the parameters in
this table are standard in the literature, it is important to note that there is no
general agreement on the appropriate value of the trade elasticity of substitution
for aggregate open economy models. Some authors have emphasized elasticities well
above one as empirically relevant. For instance, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum
(2003) report a trade elasticity of substitution in the range of 4, while Benigno and
Thoenissen (2008) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008) stress that values lower
than 1 can also be empirically relevant. Accordingly, we explore the whole range of
relevant values, [0.65, 4], as measured by 1+ρ
c
ρc
, the trade elasticity in our model.
We use second-order perturbation methods to approximate the conditions for an
equilibrium implied under cooperative and nationally-oriented policies (see the max-
imization problems in Equations 15 and 16, respectively). To derive the analytical
conditions for an equilibrium under these two policies we apply the symbolic differ-
entiation toolbox of Bodenstein, Guerrieri, and LaBriola (2019). We follow Benigno
and Benigno (2006) in using domestic price inflation as the policy instrument.8
3 Analytical Framework
Our main interest is to explore the conditions under which cooperative behavior
yields significant welfare gains, as well as to characterize the circumstances that may
7We defined the output gap as the difference between output in the model with nominal price and wage
rigidities and output in the analogous model with flexible prices and wages.
8 For the second-order perturbation solution we rely on Dynare. See Adjemian, Bastani, Karame´, Juillard,
Maih, Mihoubi, Perendia, Pfeifer, Ratto, and Villemot (2011). All the model statistics reported below are com-
puted using a true second-order approximation, using the pruning algorithm described in Kim, Kim, Schaumburg,
and Sims (2008).
13
Table 1: Parameters for the Baseline Two-Country Model
Parameter Used to Determine Parameter Used to Determine
β = 0.995 discount factor κ = 0.5 consumption habits
χ = 1/2.84 labor supply elasticity = 1
χ
L¯ = 1/3 steady-state labor supply to fix χ0
ξp = 0.75 price stickiness ξw = 0.75 wage stickiness
θp = 0.1 price markup (before subsidy) θw = 0.1 wage markup (before subsidy)
τp = 0.1 subsidy to producers τw = 0.1 subsidy to unions
ωc = 0.88 home bias in consumption ω = 0.5 weight of home country in global welfare
φb = 10−4 governs bond intermediation cost η = 0.5 share of bonds in home country currency
ρz = 0.95 persistence of tech. shock σz = 0.015 std. of tech. shock
Note: This table summarizes the parameterization of the baseline two-country model described in Section at
quarterly frequency.
motivate policymakers to switch from cooperative behavior to the aggressive pursuit
of national goals. In this section, we first provide an illustration of the difference in
macroeconomic dynamics under the two regimes. Then we explain the methods we
employ to address our questions of interest.
3.1 From Cooperative Policies to Currency Wars
An intuitive way of gauging the difference between cooperative and non-cooperative
policies is to scrutinize the paths of a few key macroeconomic variables under the
two regimes, starting from the same initial conditions. We construct an example
of transition paths by choosing a set of initial conditions drawn from the ergodic
distribution of the model under cooperative policies (characterized in a later section).
At the particular conditions, the home country is a creditor.9
As a creditor, the inflow of interest payments allows the home country to ex-
ert less labor effort and maintain a higher consumption profile, implying a lower
marginal utility. Accordingly, the cooperative policy can enhance overall welfare by
compressing the creditor’s consumption per unit of labor effort, while expanding the
debtor’s. At these initial conditions, inflation is below its steady-state value at home
and abroad; the exchange rate is mildly depreciated.
9 In this example economy, the trade elasticity is 4 and borrowing and lending is conducted through an equally
weighted basket of bonds denominated in each of the two currencies, i.e., η = 1
2
.
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In this situation, the home country has an incentive to use self-interested mone-
tary measures to reverse the cooperative redistribution. The incentive is to improve
the country’s terms of trade by a monetary contraction that lowers inflation and
leads to an unanticipated appreciation of the real exchange rate. Better terms of
trade mean lower labor effort for any given level of consumption. A sharp apprecia-
tion of the currency of the home country also reduces its net exports and leads to a
drop in its NFA position.
In equilibrium, of course, the foreign debtor will not remain idle. It will have
an incentive to lean against the home appreciation, spurring the home country to
redouble its efforts to improve its terms of trade—an interaction that is typically
dubbed exchange rate war. This war has negative consequences, such as greater
price dispersion, below-target inflation and real wage misalignment. These conse-
quences moderate and eventually offset the gains from attempting to improve the
consumption-to-labor ratio via monetary policy. The final outcome is a global loss
of efficiency and welfare.
The equilibrium paths for key variables are shown in Figure 1. The path for the
non-cooperative case is shown in deviation from the case in which the two countries
continue to cooperate. The currency war results for both countries in an initial fall
in inflation, consumption, and hours worked relative to cooperation. Nonetheless,
the home country manages to engineer a real appreciation, hence hours worked drop
more than in the foreign country. While this drop in hours worked is beneficial for
the home country, both countries end up being worse off under non-cooperation. The
exchange rate war produces no winner. Rather, as we show below, the war results
in substantial efficiency and welfare losses.
3.2 Assessing the Gains from Cooperation and the Incentive
to Deviate from Cooperative Behavior
The preceding example suggests that the macroeconomic and welfare differences
between cooperative and non-cooperative arrangements are systematically related to
prevailing economic conditions, and so are the incentives to deviate from cooperation.
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Below, we detail the methods we deploy to study these relationships. We define the
way we size the gains from cooperation, the cost of business cycles, the incentives to
deviate from cooperation, Pareto efficiency gains, and the incentives to deviate from
implicit cooperative arrangements implied by inflation-targeting policies.
3.2.1 The Gains from Cooperation
To size the gains from cooperation, we rely on a comparison of the conditional welfare
values attained under the cooperative and the nationally-oriented policies.10 Specifi-
cally, rather than focusing on one arbitrary point, which in the literature is typically
the deterministic steady state, we sample transition points from the ergodic distribu-
tion of the model under the cooperative equilibrium, and assess welfare conditional
on each of these points. To this purpose, we draw random sequences of shocks for
250 periods. The final point in this series provides the transition point for the wel-
fare comparison of the two policies (denoted by x˜250). We compare the conditional
welfare implied by non-cooperative policies starting in period 251 with the condi-
tional welfare implied by continued reliance on cooperative policies. We construct a
distribution of gains from cooperation (losses from non-cooperative policies) based
on a sample of 1000 transition points from the ergodic distribution.
To interpret the units of conditional welfare, we follow the standard metric of
consumption equivalent variation. We report the consumption subsidy that would
have to be offered in perpetuity to households for them to attain the same level of
welfare under the nationally-oriented policies as under the cooperative policies. The
subsidy net rate τ equals
τ = exp
(
1− β
ω
(
Welf coopt −Welf
nat
t
))
− 1.
Welf coopt = ωU
coop
1,t +(1−ω)U
coop
2,t denotes the global welfare level attained under the
cooperative equilibrium and, similarly, Welfnatt is the global welfare level attained
under the non-cooperative equilibrium. The derivation of this subsidy is detailed in
Appendix B. In the following sections, we report the mean and other characterstics
10 See Kim and Kim (2018) for a discussion of how optimal policies based on conditional welfare measures can
appear suboptimal when ranked with unconditional welfare measures.
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of the distribution of this subsidy, such as the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles.
3.2.2 The Cost of Business Cycles
To interpret the gains from cooperation, τ , we compare them against a measure of
the cost of economic fluctuations. Focusing on the cooperative equilibrium, following
Lucas (2003), we size the cost of economic fluctuations as the consumption equiv-
alent variation that, starting from the deterministic steady state, with all current
and future shocks excluded, would keep households indifferent from having to face
shocks.11
3.2.3 Incentives to Deviate
Across points of the ergodic distribution, given the different state of the economy at
each point, there could be substantial variation in the incentives for policymakers
to keep their commitment to cooperation, as opposed to considering a new course
of policy strategies, more narrowly focused on national objectives. To assess these
incentives, we consider the following two-stage game.
In the first stage, conditional on each transition point x˜250, we let a country
choose between cooperate or deviate. If country j chooses cooperate, its objective is
the global welfare function ωU1,t + (1 − ω)U2,t; if it chooses deviate, its objective is
the national welfare function Uj,t, for j = 1, 2. In the second stage, the two countries
play an open-loop Nash game (as described in Section 2.2.2) that determines each
country’s welfare given the actions selected in the first stage and conditional on the
transition point x˜250.
12 Note that, if both countries choose cooperate in the first stage,
the second stage game yields the same outcomes as the cooperative policies defined
in Section 2.2.1. Analogously, if both countries choose deviate in the first stage, the
second stage game yields the same outcomes as the non-cooperative policies defined
in Section 2.2.2.
11Mechanically, the two economies have identical second-order perturbation solutions, but for a vector of
constants (the stochastic shift factor) that enters the economy with shocks and that drops out of the other
economy without shocks. To encompass the effects of current shocks, we draw 1000 random shock vectors, and
average the consumption equivalent variation for each shock vector.
12The objective functions of the policymakers in Equation (16) are determined by the actions chosen in the
first stage of the game.
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3.2.4 Efficiency Gains and the Pareto Frontier
Since we model symmetric countries, a natural starting point is to assume a co-
operative welfare function that puts equal weights on the utility of each country.13
However, along the points of the ergodic distribution, countries are no longer sym-
metric, and one may wonder whether equal weights may cause our results to reflect
redistribution under cooperation, rather than only gains in efficiency.
For this reason, in addition to the welfare analysis based on equal weights for the
utility of each country, we also consider a Pareto approach. For this approach, we
construct the Pareto frontier by varying the welfare weight ω over the range from 0
to 1 at each transition point. We compare the non-cooperative and cooperative allo-
cations by considering the changes in utility consistent with making either country
better off without making the other country worse off. Previewing our results, we
find that this parsimonious approach still delivers large efficiency gains relative to
the cost of business cycles.
4 Fragility of Cooperation with Growing External
Imbalances
Under incomplete financial markets, consumption smoothing in the face of economic
disturbances typically leads to the accumulation of external imbalances (NFA posi-
tions). Once these imbalances widen, the creditor country will have a lower marginal
utility of consumption and leisure. As suggested by our example in section 3.1, the
cooperative planner will improve global welfare by setting monetary policy to redis-
tribute consumption and leisure from the creditor country to the debtor country. It
is this redistribution that creates an incentive to deviate from cooperation, with each
country attempting to get a larger share of global resources, at the cost of some mis-
allocation of domestic resources. The inherent tradeoff between external and internal
objectives moderates the unbrindled pursuit of non-cooperative policies.
13Giving each country the same weight (ω = 1
2
) in the global welfare function ensures that the cooperative
and the non-cooperative game yield the same deterministic steady state in our setup with symmetric, equal-
sized countries. Moreover, this deterministic steady state coincides with the steady state for the competitive
equilibrium under flexible prices and wages.
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Before turning to our results, recall that, our baseline parameterization implies
that countries borrow and lend trading an equally-weighted portfolio of domestic-
currency and foreign-currency denominated bonds. With this portfolio, monetary
policy cannot influence the value of NFA positions by manipulating the exchange
rate ex post—ruling out surprise valuation effects.
4.1 Net Foreign Assets and the Gains from Cooperation
Figure 2 provides a striking illustration of the importance of external balance accu-
mulation as a key driver of the gains from cooperation. The results shown in the
figure refer to an economy for which technology shocks are the only economic dis-
turbances. The top panel depicts the ergodic probability density functon (PDF) for
the NFA position of the home country, measured in percent of annualized output for
four values of the trade elasticity 1+ρ
c
ρc
= {0.7; 0.8; 2; 4}. The bottom panel plots the
gains from cooperation against NFA positions for each of the 1000 transition points
drawn from the ergodic distribution under the cooperative policies, as detailed in
Section 3.2.
In our baseline, we intentionally assume that technology shocks are the only
sources of economic fluctuations. Accordingly, the (ergodic) distribution of NFA posi-
tions under the cooperative policies varies with the trade elasticity non-monotonically.
As is well known from Cole and Obstfeld (1991), technology shocks cause no accu-
mulation of net foreign assets/debts under a unitary trade elasticity and log-utility
over consumption (i.e., home and foreign goods are neither substitutes nor comple-
ments), since in this limit case terms of trade movements provide efficient risk sharing
without the need for trading assets. The distribution of NFA positions in Figure 2,
however, becomes more dispersed either as the trade elasticity falls below 1 or as it
rises above 1. Extreme NFA positions are more likely under a high trade elasticity,
well above 1, than under a low elasticity, well below 1.
The gains from cooperation depend on the NFA position at that transition point.
As shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2, fixing the value of the trade elasticity,
the gains from cooperation increase with the (absolute) value of NFA position. Con-
versely, fixing the value of NFA position, the gains from cooperation increase as the
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value of the trade elasticity declines. For NFA positions close to zero, the gains are
negligible regardless of the value of the trade elasticity.
The figure suggests that the other endogenous variables, apart from the NFA
position, play a negligible role in influencing the size of the gains. To wit, if other
variables played a sizable role, the points shown in the bottom panel would not line
up in a neat parabola. We confirmed this result with a regression of the gains from
cooperation on the NFA positions and their squares. The regression yields an R2
statistic of 0.99, confirming that the other endogenous variables at the transition
point have no meaningful role in influencing the gains from cooperation.
Figure 3 plots the welfare gains from continuing to cooperate rather than adopting
nationally-oriented policies, averaging over the 1000 transition points (the dashed-
dotted line), against the trade elasticity. The figure shows the mean together with the
5th and 95th percentiles (the dotted lines) of the distribution of gains associated with
the 1000 transition points. For comparison, the figure also plots the cost of business
cycles, i.e., the gains that would accrue if all fluctuations were to be eliminated,
shown by the dashed line.
The figure highlights one of our key results. The gains from cooperation can be
much higher than the cost of business cycles—and are large for trade elasticities
away from 1. With trade elasticities higher than 1, this result is driven by the
higher likelihood of large trade imbalances. Conversely, for trade elasticities lower
than 1, gains from cooperation are large even for modest trade imbalances—this
is because the equilibrium response of the terms of trade to monetary policy are
quite pronounced, causing large monetary spillovers. With the distribution of NFA
positions concentrated at zero for trade elasticities near 1, the mean of the gains is
0 and there is no variation. Note that the distance between the percentiles shown in
the bottom graph implies that the variation in the gains is higher when the average
gains from cooperation are higher.
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4.2 Incentives to Deviate from Cooperation and the Distri-
bution of Gains and Losses
The outcomes discussed in the preceding section for each particular transition point
incorporate the reaction of the foreign country to the non-cooperative policy switch
in the home country. Accordingly, we only captured the final equilibrium. To account
for the incentives to deviate from the cooperative behavior, we rely on the two-stage
game described in section 3.2.3. At each transition point, in the first stage we let a
country choose between cooperate or deviate; in the second stage, we let them play
an open-loop Nash game conditional on the choices in the first stage.
For all combinations of actions in the first stage of the game, Figure 4 plots the
payoffs of the second-stage game against the home country’s NFA position at each
transition point x˜250 for the case of a trade elasticity equal to 4.
14 The payoffs are
expressed as country-specific consumption-equivalent variations (τ 1, τ 2). By con-
struction, τ 1 and τ 2 are 0 regardless of the NFA position if both countries choose
cooperate. For concreteness, we report in Table 2 the payoffs at a particular transi-
tion point. In this example, the home country has a debt position of 50 percent of
(annualized) output.15
Table 2: Payoff Matrix in the Two-Stage Game
home
cooperate deviate
foreign
cooperate (0, 0) (0.45%,−0.62%)
deviate (−0.62%, 0.45%) (−0.18%,−0.18%)
The takeaways from Figure 4 and the specific example shown in Table 2 are
straightforward. First, when the home country deviates from coopration and the
foreign country continues to cooperate, the configuration considered in the upper
right panel of the figure, the home country is better off deviating, regardless of
14The country-specific consumption-equivalent variation τ j , j = 1, 2, measures the consumption subsidy/tax
that would have to be offered in perpetuity to each household in country j to attain the same level of welfare as
under the cooperative policies. See Appendix B.
15 In the Nash equilibrium, the sum τ1 + τ2 is equal, to a first order approximation, to minus the gains from
cooperation τ reported earlier. See Appendix B.
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whether it is a net creditor or a net debtor. Moreover, the home country is better off
deviating also when the foreign country deviates, as can be evinced by comparing the
payoffs for the home country across the bottom two panels of the figure. Accordingly,
deviate is a dominant strategy for the home country for all transition points. By
symmetry, deviate is also a dominant strategy for the foreign country for all transition
points (see the lower left panel of the figure).
Second, since deviate is a dominant strategy for both countries in the first stage
of the game, the unique Nash equilibrium in the game features both countries opting
for their respective nationally-oriented welfare function Uj,t, for j = 1, 2, in the first
stage, followed by the open-loop Nash game in the second stage. As countries borrow
and lend by trading a diversified portfolio of bonds denominated in both currencies,
exchange rate movements do not change the value of their net positions ex post,
limiting the scope for cross-country redistribution via monetary measures. With
each country responding to the attempt by the other to tilt the terms of trade in
favor of its residents, the Nash equilibrium results in inefficient inflation and output
stabilization. As shown in the lower right panel in the figure, national welfare falls
with the deterioration in the efficiency of the global allocation.
4.3 Efficiency Gains
We now show that much of the benefits from cooperation discussed so far stem
from efficiency gains. For this analysis, when countries continue to cooperate, we do
not impose balanced welfare weights (ω = 0.5 for each country), but compute the
cooperative allocations for a range of welfare weights, allowing us to trace the Pareto
frontier, as discussed in Section 3.2.4.
The top panel of Figure 5 shows the Pareto frontier for one of the randomly drawn
1000 transition points. As an example, we consider the case of a trade elasticity of
substitution equal to 4. At that transition point, the home country has a net debt
balance of 50% of (annualized) output—recall that the ergodic probability density
function for the NFA position of the home country is shown in the top panel of
Figure 2 for this case). The X symbol in the top panel of Figure 5 marks the utility
levels associated with the non-cooperative outcome. This outcome is inefficient, as
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indicated by its position inside the Pareto frontier. The broken lines in the chart
start from the non-cooperative outcome and reach the frontier to denote alternative
outcomes that would leave either country better off without making the other country
worse off.
The bottom panel summarizes the Pareto gains for each country for alternative
transition points. Again, we expressed the gains as consumption equivalent variation.
For comparison, the panel also shows the gains from cooperation from the global
welfare function based on symmetric weights.16 The welfare gains include efficiency
gains, but also encompass gains from allocating these efficiency gains to each country
optimally, and (possibly) gains from redistribution. The proximity of the global
welfare gains to the Pareto gains shown in the figure points to efficiency as being the
principal source of gains.
4.4 “Keeping One’s House in Order”
In our baseline analysis, we follow the literature by contrasting the case of full coop-
eration with (open-loop) non-cooperative strategies under commitment. In practice,
central banks have the mandate to achieve a small set of nationally-oriented ob-
jectives, such as domestic price stability and full resource utilization, which can be
modeled as flexible inflation targeting, see Section 2.2.3.
In the model, flexible-inflation-targeting policies that place a sufficiently large
weight on the output gap can come close to replicating the cooperative case. For
instance, with weights wpi = 1 and wy = 10 for the loss function in Equation (18), the
global welfare loss amounts to a modest 3 basis points of consumption. Accordingly,
flexible inflation targeting can be tantamount to implicit cooperation. However,
as external imbalances develop, we expect the incentives to deviate from flexible
inflation targeting to be just as strong as for the case of explicit cooperation.
We assess the incentives to deviate from flexible inflation targeting towards objec-
tives that consider the full spectrum of each country’s welfare (see Equation 2) using
16To facilitate the comparison across different cases shown, rather than plotting a dot for consumption variation
corresponding to each of the 1000 transition points randomly drawn from the ergodic distribution, we fit a fourth-
order polynomial function. Apart from the polynomial interpolation, the blue line shown in the figure matches
the results also shown in the bottom panel of Figure 2.
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the same two-stage game as in the previous section. In the first stage, each country
can choose between inflation targeting and deviate, given the transition point x˜250.
If country j chooses inflation targeting, its objective is given by Equation (18); if
it chooses deviate, its objective is the national welfare function Uj,t, for j = 1, 2 in
Equation (2). In the second stage, the two countries play an open-loop Nash game
that determines each country’s welfare given the actions selected at the first stage
and conditional on the transition point x˜250.
Just like Figure 4, Figure 6 plots the country-specific consumption-equivalent
variation of the second stage game against the home country’s NFA position for each
transition point. The results are strikingly similar to those of Figure 4, but the con-
sumption variation curves are steeper, reflecting the added incentives to move away
from sub-optimal, simple objectives towards national welfare functions. Accordingly,
inflation targeting is a dominated strategy. In the Nash equilibrium, policymakers
in both countries would choose deviate in the first stage.
5 How General Are Our Results?
In this section we reconsider our results with a number of popular variants of the
workhorse monetary model. To start, we allow for valuation effects of the exchange
rate on the ex-post return of external assets.17 We then consider alternative specifica-
tions of nominal rigidities in export pricing, which affect exchange rate passthrough
as well as alternative sources of business cycle disturbances.
5.1 Asymmetric International Asset Portfolios and Valua-
tion Effects
We now assume that each country’s foreign asset position is denominated solely in
the currency of the home country, i.e., we set η = 0 in Equations (3) and (4). This
privilege gives greater power to the home country’s monetary policy instrument,
which can now reset the real interest rate on foreign debt/assets.
17 See Gourinchas and Rey (2014) for an overview of the importance of valuation effects for global imbalances.
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Figure 7 shows again the gains from cooperation for different values of the trade
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. The setup is analogous
to that of Figure 3, described in Section 4.1. Notice that in this case, monetary policy
has additional reverberations. With asymmetric asset portfolios, surprise inflation
movements can influence the NFA position. These additional effect boost the gains
from cooperation relative to the symmetric case.
Revisiting the two-stage game described in Section 4.2 , Figure 8 shows the payoffs
for each country depending on the transition point. The magnitude of the NFA
position continues to drive the gains from cooperation—a regression of the gains
from cooperation on the NFA position at the transition point yields an R2 statistic
of 0.99.
The home country is now better off by deviating than continuing to cooperate,
regardless of the choice of the foreign country. Deviating is also a dominant strategy
for the foreign country; accordingly the strategies deviate,deviate are a Nash equi-
librium. We verified that deviate is a dominant strategy for each country regardless
of the characteristics of the transition point.
Notice that, while both the home and the foreign country can affect the value of
their interest payments (ex post) through the real exchange rate, the home country
has an additional prerogative. Since nominal debt/asset contracts are written in
the home currency, the home country also has the ability to change the ex-post real
interest rate. This additional reach of monetary policy makes the home country the
winner of the second stage of the game, regardless of whether it is a debtor or a
creditor. However, winning the war for global resources is not without consequences.
As apparent from the figure, in consumption equivalent terms, the gain of the home
country is smaller than the loss of the foreign country. Taken together, the global
economy is worse off.18
In this case, redistribution plays a non-negligible role in driving the welfare of the
two countries apart. The top panel of Figure 9 focuses again on a transition point
18These results could be interpreted as one dimension of the privilege enjoyed by countries that can borrow and
lend with bonds denominated in their own currency. In this respect, a note of caution is in order. Extrapolating
from the preceding results, if a country borrowing and lending in its own currency adopted nationally-oriented
policies, that privilege could be expected to come under stress soon.
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in which the debt of the home country to the foreign country amounts to 50% of the
output of the home country. By engineering a surprise devaluation of the stock of
nominal debt, the non-cooperative policy moves the allocation both well inside the
Pareto frontier and away from the equal-weight point. Notice that the redistribution
is in favor of the home country.
As can be seen in the bottom panel of the figure, which shows again the welfare
gains and the Pareto efficiency gains for each country, the Pareto gains for the home
country are lower than for the foreign country, as the redistribution shown in the
top panel lowers its marginal utility of consumption relative to the home country.
While redistribution is more important in this case, efficiency gains continue to play
an important role.
5.2 Exchange Rate Passthrough
The baseline model features producer-currency-pricing. Accordingly, exchange rate
movements influence import prices one for one; exchange rate passthrough is full.
We now show that the gains from cooperation are on average larger and more dis-
perse when exchange rate passthrough is less-than-full. In this case, we revert to
a symmetric portfolio of international bonds. The top row in Figure 10 shows the
gains from cooperation for different values of the trade elasticity of substitution for
the case of local-currency-pricing (exports are denominated in the currency of the
importing country) and dominant-currency-pricing (exports are denominated in the
home country’s currency for all countries). The gray-shaded area shows the range of
outcomes under the baseline model.
The reason why the gains from cooperation are higher under low exchange rate
passthrough lies in the exchange rate sensitivity of the global demand for domestic
goods. Under high exchange rate passthrough, a country’s attempts to alter its
NFA position through monetary policy and the exchange rate strongly affect the
country’s competitiveness in product markets. The negative welfare consequences of
the induced output movements offset the gains from altering the NFA position. If
passthrough is low, this offseting mechanism is muted. With the country’s incentives
to affect the NFA positions not held in check, the use of monetary policy to becomes
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more aggressive.19
Intuitively, these considerations apply more forcefully in the case of local-currency-
pricing, when both countries have less-than-full passthrough of exchange rate move-
ments to trade prices, than under dominant-currency-pricing, when the less-than-full
passthrough applies to only one country.
The left panel of the middle row of Figure 10 considers the case of dominant-
currency-pricing with an asymmetric international bond portfolio for which each
country’s foreign asset position is denominated only in the home country’s currency.
Combining these two features further enhances the ability of the home country to
compete in products markets and boosts the gains from cooperation.
5.3 Productivity vs. Demand Shocks
Thus far, we have focused on technology shocks as the only source of economic
disturbances. The terms of trade movements induced by the technology shock tend
to stabilize the global economy, reducing the need for holding and issuing external
debt, in particular for trade elasticities near unity. This feature of the model works
against finding sizable gains from cooperation.
By contrast, for demand-type shocks, terms of trade movements do not offset the
need for trading assets to share risk for any value of the trade elasticity. One shock
of this type is a valuation shock; this shock alters the effective time preference of
households, capturing households’ time-varying preferences for consuming or saving.
In an open economy setting, valuation shocks induce international borrowing and
lending and may give rise to large external imbalances. Following Albuquerque,
Eichenbaum, Luo, and Rebelo (2016), we implement the valuation shock in the
19Devereux and Engel (2003) also consider how local-currency-pricing affects cooperative and non-cooperative
policies. In a model with complete markets, they focus on the special case in which the trade elasticity of
substitution and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are the inverse of each other, see Cole and Obstfeld
(1991), which lends analytical tractability but masks the differences between cooperative and non-cooperative
equilibria. Relatedly, Fujiwara and Wang (2017) show that the welfare gains from cooperation are larger under
local-currency-pricing than producer-currcency-pricing in a model similar to ours but with complete markets.
However, given their choices of parameters and initial conditions, the welfare gains from cooperation remain
negligible regardless of the assumptions about the currency of invoicing.
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home country ι1,t as follows
U1,t = Et
∞∑
j=0
ι1,t+jβ
j
{
ln (C1,t+j − κC1,t+j−1)−
χ0
1 + χ
L1+χ1,t+j
}
(19)
with the growth rate of ι1,t following an auto-regressive process of order 1
ln
(
ι1,t
ι1,t−1
)
= ρι ln
(
ι1,t−1
ι1,t−2
)
+ σιει1,t. (20)
Here, ει1,t is an i.i.d. standard-normal random variable. We set the persistence of the
shock process ρι = 0.95 and its standard deviation σι = 0.00089. The unconditional
variance of the growth rate of ι1,t is the same as in Albuquerque, Eichenbaum, Luo,
and Rebelo (2016).20 The valuation shock in the foreign country is implemented
analogously.
The right-hand panel in the middle row of Figure 10 compares the gains from
cooperation for a model that includes valuation shocks as well as technology shocks
with the gains for a model with only technology shocks. The notable difference is
that the gains from cooperation do not drop to 0 for trade elasticities near unity.
This feature is easily understood by noticing that valuation shocks profoundly alter
the ergodic distribution of NFA positions. With trade elasticities near unity, the
support of the distribution of NFA positions will be broad in the face of valuation
shocks; by contrast, in the face of technology shocks the support will be narrowly
concentrated around 0.
6 Financial markets
We have seen that, under incomplete markets the key tradeoffs that may moti-
vate policymakers to deviate from cooperative practices arise from the accumulation
of foreign debt—the temptation to monetary policy is to manipulate the interest
payments on foreign assets, at the cost of inefficient price and wage stabilization.
Shutting down the accumulation of non-state-contingent debt by assuming, in turn,
20Albuquerque, Eichenbaum, Luo, and Rebelo (2016) specify the shock to be more persist, but to be of smaller
standard deviation.
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complete markets or financial autarky allows us to highlight alternative economic
conditions that shape the gains from cooperation.
6.1 Fragility of Cooperation with Growing Real Wage Mis-
alignment under Complete Financial Markets
Under complete markets, since agents have access to a full set of state-contingent
claims, monetary policy loses the ability to influence asset positions through inflation.
Nonetheless, in the presence of nominal rigidities, monetary policy can still influence
real allocations, and the real wage, in particular. To the extent that national trade-
offs will be judged differently by national policymakers that do not internalize the
spillover effects of their actions on foreign welfare, there will still be large gains from
cooperation.
In line with this insight, we now show that under complete financial markets, the
temptation to deviate from cooperation is increasing in the tradeoffs between inflation
and unemployment, as is the case when price and wage rigidities translate into large
and divergent real wage distortions. For ease of comparison with the literature and
our previous analysis, we again focus again on a model that includes only technology
shocks, and plot the gains from cooperation for different values of the trade elasticity.
The bottom left panel of Figure 10 shows that, for our benchmark parameters, the
gains from cooperation under complete markets rise monotonically with the trade
elasticity. In other words, the spillover effects of country-specific monetary policy rise
with the trade elasticity, leading to stronger strategic interactions. In the highest
range of the trade elasticities we consider, from about 2.5 to 4, the gains rise to
multiple times the cost of business cycles.
As for the incomplete market economies studied in the previous sections, the gains
from cooperation continue to depend on the characteristics of the transition point
between cooperation and non-cooperation under complete markets, and the welfare
cost of a switch to non-cooperation can be tracked closely by a subset of the state
variables. Recall that, under incomplete markets, the R2 statistic for a regression
of the gains from cooperation on the NFA imbalances and its square is 0.99. When
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markets are complete, we attain an R2 of 0.99 regressing the gains from cooperation
on domestic and foreign real wages (and their squares). The intuition for this finding
is that the real wage at home and abroad maintain an imprint of how the cooperative
policies have allocated consumption and hours worked in each country, a role similar
to the role of the NFA position under incomplete markets.
Intuitively, gains from cooperation stem from the fact that, relative to coop-
eration, countries with higher real wages (possibly because of positive technology
shocks) would like to pursue nominal and real exchange rate appreciation to benefit
from higher leisure. Under complete markets, conditional on real wages and pro-
ductivity being high, the gains in terms of leisure from extra monetary contraction
cum appreciation (relative to cooperation) are larger than the cost of reducing con-
sumption (which is high to start with) and producing some wage inflation dispersion.
Accounting for retaliation, the non-cooperative equilibrium implies an allocation with
too much inflation and suboptimal stabilization.
6.2 Financial Autarky
Under financial autarky, the determinants of the gains from cooperation can be
expected to be similar to those under complete markets. We confirmed this insight
by regressing the gains from cooperation on the real wage at home and abroad (and
their squares) for each transition point. The R2 statistic is again 0.99 (irrespective
of the trade elasticity chosen).
However, without trade in assets, the gains from cooperation are much dimin-
ished. As shown in the bottom left panel of Figure 10, they are non negligible (but
quite modest) only for low trade elasticities, below 0.7. Unlike under complete mar-
kets, non-cooperative policies result in non-negligible spillover effects abroad only as
the trade elasticity shrinks. Absent risk sharing via financial markets, agents are
no longer able to insure their consumption from undesired effects of non-cooperative
policies. At high real wages, the perceived gains from attempting to improve leisure
by improving a country terms of trade are moderated by the costs in terms of con-
sumption.
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7 Conclusion
The idea that international monetary cooperation can yield substantial benefits has
traditionally been met with deep skepticism. Over the past five decades, one can
identify at least three waves of criticisms. In the 1970s, when calls for cooperation
were motivated by the need for joint management of large global shocks, such as the
oil shocks, critics pointed out that negotiating the appropriate joint response took
too long, and agreement was typically reached too late, after the worst effects of the
shock had already abated. Moreover, throughout the 1970s, some countries systemat-
ically failed to deliver on the agreed action plan, reinforcing the view that cooperative
agreements were unavoidably plagued by free riding and incentive-compatibility is-
sues. A fundamental objection was formalized by Rogoff (1985), in the context of the
disinflation policies during the 1980s. Rogoff warned that, while cooperation may
be effective in internalizing cross-border demand spillovers, it may also reduce the
credibility of central banks vis-a`-vis the private sector, frustrating disinflation efforts.
While these criticisms point to extant problems, a third and overarching criticism
to cooperative monetary arrangements was leveled more recently by Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2002), when these authors claimed that in modern monetary models, gains
from cooperation are negligible, relative to both best-practice monetary policy and
full-fledged Nash equilibrium policy strategies. While these authors focused on a
special version of the workhorse monetary model, the subsequent literature did not
overturn their findings.21
Our results are in line with this recent literature, in that they strengthen the
theoretical support for the view that the gains of full cooperation may be small
relative to best practice flexible inflation targeting. But our analysis also shows
that the range of theoretical results from open economy macro theory is broader
than previously acknowledged, and that policies consistent with a non-cooperative
Nash equilibrium can be consequential for global welfare. Our contributions to the
literature can be summarized in six points.
21The baseline model of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002) assumes that technology shocks are the only source
of economic fluctuations and that the trade elasticity and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution are the
inverse of each other, the case discussed by Cole and Obstfeld (1991), for which we have shown that the gains
from cooperation are minimized.
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First and foremost, using the same model that has lent support to the claim
by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), we have shown that there are empirically plausible
conditions that make the gains from cooperation several times larger than the cost
of economic fluctuations. Our second point is methodological: welfare gains from
cooperation are to be assessed conditional on economic conditions. Our third point
concerns the nature of these gains. While non-cooperative strategies are essentially
redistributive (aiming to improve the terms of trade of a country), welfare gains
from cooperation are largely driven by Pareto efficiency gains—the efficiency cost of
non-cooperative policies can be large. This is so even when foreign (nominal) assets
and liabilities are denominated in one currency, giving one country the ability to
manipulate real rates of return ex post in its own favor, by means of unexpected
movements in the exchange rate.
The fourth and fifth points raise economic policy concerns. The same economic
conditions that magnify the gains from cooperation also magnify the incentives to
deviate from cooperation unilaterally, thus making cooperation more fragile exactly
when it is more beneficial. In addition, monetary policy regimes that deliver de facto
cooperation, such as flexible inflation targeting, are subject to the same incentives
to reoptimize towards fully national objectives as formal cooperative arrangements.
Our sixth and last point stresses that financial frictions are not a necessary con-
dition for monetary policy to have large cross-border spillovers. The economic con-
ditions that magnify the gains from cooperation arise under both incomplete and
complete financial markets arrangements. Financial arrangements that govern risk-
sharing and influence trade flows across countries do not determine whether there are
gains from cooperation, but which economic conditions matter the most. We have
shown that, with incomplete markets, the gains from cooperation grow quadratically
with the net-foreign-asset position—internal imbalances have little or no weight inde-
pendently of their role in driving foreign debt/wealth accumulation. With complete
markets, the gains depend on real wages at home and abroad, which bear an imprint
of how production and consumption respond to shocks.
During the last decades, the world has witnessed substantial and persistent accu-
mulation of external debt, accompanied by remarkable changes in relative incomes
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and wages. Especially in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, macroe-
conomic stabilization has been challenged by complex tradeoffs. With persistent
external and internal imbalances, domestic policymakers may become less tolerant
of the requirements of good behavior from a global perspective. Holding foreign poli-
cies constant, the perceived tradeoffs may tilt in favor of nationally-oriented policies,
which, breaking away from the post-Bretton Woods equilibrium, may be pursued in
an antagonistic way. The risk is that strong policy actions may end up magnifying
external spillovers, especially if they trigger a spiral of retaliatory actions.
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Figure 1: Transition paths from cooperation to non-cooperation—Symmetric Portfolio and Trade
Elasticity = 4
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Note: The figure shows the equilibrium transition paths for key variables when deviating from cooperation. The
non-cooperative paths are shown in deviation from the paths that obtain, abstracting from additional shocks,
if the two countries continue to cooperate. At the transition point, the home country is a creditor. The trade
elasticity is 4 and borrowing and lending is conducted through an equally weighted basket of bonds denominated
in each of the two currencies.
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Figure 2: The Distribution of the Net Foreign Assets and Gains from Cooperation for Alternative
Values of the Elasticity of Substitution between Traded Goods
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Note: The top panel shows the ergodic probability density function of the NFA position for the home country for
alternative values of the trade elasticity of substitution. For the same trade elasticities, the bottom panel shows
the expected gain from continuing to cooperate relative to adopting nationally-oriented policies. The gains are
evaluated at 1000 points randomly drawn from the ergodic distribution under cooperative policies. The welfare
difference between the two policy arrangements is translated into a consumption equivalent variation as described
in Section 3.2.1.
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Figure 3: The Gains from Cooperation as a Function of the Elasticity of Substitution between
Traded Goods—Symmetric Portfolio
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Note: The figure shows the mean gain from continuing to cooperate relative to adopting nationally-oriented
policies based on 1000 points randomly drawn from the ergodic distribution under cooperative policies (the
dashed-dotted line). The welfare difference between the two policy arrangements is translated into a consumption
equivalent variation as described in Section 3.2.1. The 5th and 95th percentiles (the dotted lines) refer to the
realized distribution of gains for the different transition points. For comparison, the figure also shows the cost
of business cycles (the dashed line), computed as described in Section 3.2.2.
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Figure 4: Two-Stage Game—Symmetric Portfolio and Trade Elasticity = 4
Note: To account for the incentives to deviate from the cooperative behavior, we rely on the two-stage game
described in section 3.2.3. At each transition point, in the first stage we let each country choose between cooperate
or deviate; in the second stage, we let the countries play an open-loop Nash game conditional on their preference
choices in the first stage. For all combinations of actions in the first stage of the game, the figure plots the
payoff of the second-stage game against the home country’s NFA position at each transition point. The payoffs
are expressed as country-specific consumption-equivalent variations (τ1, τ2). By construction, τ1 and τ2 are 0
regardless of the NFA position if both countries choose cooperate.
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Figure 5: Pareto Frontier and Efficiency Gains—Symmetric Portfolio and Trade Elasticity = 4
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Note: The top panel shows the Pareto frontier (the solid black line) for one of the randomly drawn 1000 transition
points. At that transition point, the home country has a net debt balance of 50% of (annualized) output. The
X symbol in the top panel marks the utility associated with the non-cooperative allocation. The bottom panel
summarizes the Pareto gains for each country for alternative transition points. The vertical dashed line denotes
the NFA position for the transition point used for the Pareto frontier shown in the top panel. The bottom panel
also shows the gains from cooperation from the global welfare function based on symmetric weights.
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Figure 6: Two-Stage Game, Inflation Targeting—Symmetric Portfolio and Trade Elasticity = 4
Noe: To account for the incentives to deviate from the cooperative behavior, we rely on the two-stage game
described in subsection 3.2.3. At each transition point, in the first stage we let each country choose between
inflation targeting or deviate towards national policies ; in the second stage, we let the countries play an open-loop
Nash game conditional on their preference choices in the first stage. For all combinations of actions in the first
stage of the game, the figure plots the payoff of the second-stage game against the home country’s NFA position
at each transition point. The payoffs are expressed as country-specific consumption-equivalent variations (τ1, τ2).
By construction, τ1 and τ2 are 0 regardless of the net- foreign-asset position if both countries choose cooperate.
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Figure 7: The Gains from Cooperation as a Function of the Elasticity of Substitution between
Traded goods—Asymmetric Portfolio
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Note: The figure shows the mean gain from continuing to cooperate relative to adopting nationally-oriented
policies based on 1000 points randomly drawn from the ergodic distribution under cooperative policies (the
dashed-dotted line). The welfare difference between the two policy arrangements is then translated into a
consumption equivalent variation as described in Section 3.2.1. The 5th and 95th percentiles (the dotted lines)
refer to the realized distribution of gains for the different transition points. For comparison, the figure also shows
the cost of business cycles (the dashed line), computed as described in Section 3.2.2.
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Figure 8: Two-Stage Game with Valuation Effects—Asymmetric Portfolio and Trade Elasticity
= 4
Note: To account for the incentives to deviate from the cooperative behavior, we rely on the two-stage game
described in section 3.2.3. At each transition point, in the first stage we let each country choose between cooperate
or deviate; in the second stage, we let the countries play an open-loop Nash game conditional on their preference
choices in the first stage. For all combinations of actions in the first stage of the game, the figure plots the
payoff of the second-stage game against the home country’s NFA position at each transition point. The payoffs
are expressed as country-specific consumption-equivalent variations (τ1, τ2). By construction, τ1 and τ2 are 0
regardless of the NFA position if both countries choose cooperate.
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Figure 9: Pareto Frontier and Efficiency Gains with Valuation Effects—Asymmetric Portfolio
and Trade Elasticity = 4
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Note: The top panel shows the Pareto frontier (the solid black line) for one of the randomly drawn 1000 transition
points. At that transition point, the home country has a net debt balance of 50% of (annualized) output. The
X symbol in the top panel marks the utility associated with the non-cooperative allocation. The bottom panel
summarizes the Pareto gains for each country for alternative transition points. The vertical dashed line denotes
the NFA position for the transition point used for the Pareto frontier shown in the top panel. The bottom panel
also shows the gains from cooperation from the global welfare function based on symmetric weights.
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Figure 10: The Importance of Exchange Rate Passthrough, Shock Sources, and Financial Ar-
rangements for the Gains from Cooperation
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Note: The figure shows the mean gain from continuing to cooperate relative to adopting nationally-oriented
policies based on 1000 points randomly drawn from the ergodic distribution under cooperative policies (the
dashed-dotted line). The welfare difference between the two policy arrangements is then translated into a
consumption equivalent variation as described in Section 3.2.1. The 5th and 95th percentiles (the dotted lines)
refer to the realized distribution of gains for the different transition points. Each panel focuses on an alternative
model as discussed in Section 5. For comparison, the shaded area in each panel shows the 5th-95th interval
for the gains from cooperation for the baseline model with incomplete markets and a symmetric portfolio of
international bonds.
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Appendix
A Appendix: Model description
We provide a detailed description of the model sketched in the main text. Nota-
tion and mathematical expressions are lined up with the Dynare codes used in the
numerical implementation of our analysis.
A.1 Relative Prices
We define
νj,t =
Pmj,t
P dj,t
(A.1)
for j = [1, 2] to be the relative price of the imported good in local currency Pmj,t and
the exported good in local currency P dj,t of country j. We denote by
δ1,t =
Pm1,t
e1,tP
m
2,t
=
ν1,tP
d
1,t
ν2,te1,tP
d
2,t
. (A.2)
the ratio of import prices expressed in common currency. e1,t is the nominal exchange
rate.
Given the assumptions spelled out below, the relative prices
P c1,t
P d
1,t
and
P c2,t
P d
2,t
can then
be expressed as
P c1,t
P d1,t
=
[
ωc1 + (1− ω
c
1)ν
− 1
ρc
1,t
]−ρc
= F−ρ
c
1,t , (A.3)
P c2,t
P d2,t
=
[
ωc2 + (1− ω
c
2)ν
− 1
ρc
2,t
]−ρc
= F−ρ
c
2,t . (A.4)
P cj,t is the price of the final consumption good in country j.
A.2 Households
Households solve the maximization problem
max
C1,t+j ,B11,t+j ,
B12,t+j ,D1,t+1+j|t+j
Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
{
ln (C1,t+j − κC1,t+j−1)−
χ0
1 + χ
L1+χ1,t+j
}
s.t.
P c1,t+jC1,t+j +
P b1,t+jB11,t+j + e1,t+jP
b
2,t+jB12,t+j
φb1,t+j
+
∫
S
PD1,t+1+j|t+jD1,t+1+j|t+j =
W1,t+jL1,t+j +B11,t−1+j + e1,t+jB12,t−1+j +D1,t+j|t−1+j + T1,t+j
ηB11,t+j = (1− η)e1,t+jB12,t+j .
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The first order conditions associated with this problem can be written as
MU1,t =
(
1
1− κ
C1,t−1
C1,t
−
βκ
C1,t+1
C1,t
− κ
)
1
C1,t
, (A.5)
W˜1,t
P d1,t
= χ0,1
L
χ1
1,t
MU1,t
1
F ρ
c
1,t
, (A.6)
1
1 +R1,t
= βEt
{
MU1,t+1
MU1,t
P d1,t
P d1,t+1
(
F1,t+1
F1,t
)ρc}
, (A.7)
P˜ b1,t ≡ (1− η)P
b
1,t + ηP
b
2,t,
= φb1,tβEt
{
MU1,t+1
MU1,t
δ1,t+1
δ1,t
ν1,t+1
ν1,t
ν2,t
ν2,t+1
(
F1,t+1
F1,t
)ρc P d2,t
P d2,t+1
(
(1− η)
e1,t
e1,t+1
+ η
)}
.
(A.8)
The term MU1,t denotes the marginal utility of consumption. The term W˜1,t is the
wage desired by households as opposed to the wageW1,t received by households. The
intermediation cost φb1,t is given by
φb1,t = exp
(
φb
BA11,t + e1,tB
A
12,t
P d1,tC
d,A
1,t + e1,tP
m
2,tM
A
2,t
)
. (A.9)
This cost depends on the aggregate bond holdings at the country level and aggregate
output. Thus an individual household does not take into account the effects of its
choices on the intermediation costs. In equilibrium, it is of course that case that
BA11,t = B11,t, B
A
12,t = B12,t, C
d,A
1,t = C
d
1,t, and M
A
2,t = M2,t.
Our analysis tracks the NFA position of the two countries. As we solve the model
to second order accuracy, restricting the set of international assets to a single bond,
with the bond denominated in the currency of one country, introduces an asym-
metry between the two countries even if the two countries are otherwise mirroring
each other. With two bonds that are denominated in the two countries’ respective
currencies we can eliminate this asymmetry by requiring the two countries to hold
the bonds in equal proportion, i.e., η = 0.5.
The final consumption good combines the home good (priced at P d1,t) and the
foreign good (priced at Pm1,t) according to
C1,t =
(
(ωc1)
ρc
1+ρc
(
Cd1,t
) 1
1+ρc + (ωm1 )
ρc
1+ρc (M1,t)
1
1+ρc
)1+ρc
, (A.10)
with the first order conditions of cost minimization given by
Cd1,t = ω
c
1
(
P c1,t
P d1,t
) 1+ρc
ρc
C1,t = ω
c
1F
−(1+ρc)
1,t C1,t, (A.11)
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M1,t = (1− ω
c
1)
(
P c1,t
Pm1,t
) 1+ρc
ρc
C1,t = (1− ω
c
1)F
−(1+ρc)
1,t ν
− 1+ρ
c
ρc
1,t C1,t. (A.12)
A.3 Sticky Nominal Wages
Unions introduce distinguishing characteristics to the homogenous labor L1,t sup-
plied by the households and resell these services to bundlers. The bundlers sell the
aggregate labor services Ld1,t to the producers of good. It is
Ld1,t =
[∫ 1
0
L1,t(h)
1
1+θw dh
]1+θw
. (A.13)
Given the distribution of wages, profit maximization of a bundler implies the demand
function for each labor variety to satisfy
L1,t(h) =
[
W1,t(h)
W1,t
]− 1+θw
θw
Ld1,t. (A.14)
The zero-profit condition yields that the wage (paid for one unit of the aggregate
labor services) is
W1,t =
[∫ 1
0
W1,t(h)
− 1
θw dh
]−θw
. (A.15)
The labor unions price their labor service L1,t(h) using contracts as in Calvo
(1983) to maximize profits
max
W1,t(h)
Et
∞∑
j=0
(ξw)jΛ1,t+j
[
(1 + τw)Π¯jW1,t(h)− W˜1,t+j
]
L1,t+j(h)
s.t.
L1,t(h) =
[
W1,t(h)
W1,t
]− 1+θw
θw
Ld1,t.
The stochastic discount factor satisfies Λ1,t+j = β
j MU1,t+j
MU1,t
. The first order conditions
associated with the union’s maximization problem imply that the wage W ∗1,t set in
the current period by all reoptimizing unions satisfies
W ∗1,t
P d1,t
=
Hw1,t
Gw1,t
, (A.16)
with the definitions
Hw1,t =
P c
1,t
P d
1,t
MU1,t
Et


∞∑
j=0
(ξwβ)j
MU1,t+j
P c
1,t+j
P d
1,t+j
1 + θw
θw
W˜1,t+j
P d1,t+j
[(
Π¯
)j
W1,t
W1,t+j
]− 1+θw
θw
Ld1,t+j


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=
1 + θw
θw
W˜1,t
P d1,t
(
1
∆w1,t
L1,t
)
+ ξwβEt

MU1,t+1MU1,t
P c
1,t
P d
1,t
P c
1,t+1
P d
1,t+1
(
Π¯W1,t
W1,t+1
)− 1+θw
θw
Hw1,t+1


(A.17)
and
Gw1,t =
P c1,t
P d
1,t
MU1,t
Et


∞∑
j=0
(ξwβ)j
MU1,t+j
P c
1,t+j
P d
1,t+j
1 + τw
θw
(
Π¯
)j
P d1,t
P d1,t+j
[(
Π¯
)j
W1,t
W1,t+j
]− 1+θw
θw
Ld1,t+j


=
1 + τw
θw
(
1
∆w1,t
L1,t
)
+ ξwβEt

MU1,t+1MU1,t
P c
1,t
P d
1,t
P c
1,t+1
P d
1,t+1
Π¯P d1,t
P d1,t+1
(
Π¯W1,t
W1,t+1
)− 1+θw
θw
Gw1,t+1


(A.18)
Wage inflation is defined as
W1,t
W1,t−1
=
W1,t
P d1,t
P d1,t
P d1,t−1
P d1,t−1
W1,t−1
. (A.19)
The definition of the wage index, the optimal wage, and the definition of wage
inflation implies
(1− ξw)
(
W ∗1,t
P d1,t
P d1,t
W1,t
)− 1
θw
+ ξw
(
Π¯
W1,t−1
W1,t
)− 1
θw
= 1. (A.20)
The fact that household labor supply and aggregate labor services are related via
L1,t =
∫ 1
0
L1,t(h)dh = ∆
w
1,tL
d
1,t implies the dispersion in wages to satisfy
∆w1,t = (1− ξ
w)
[
W ∗1,t
P d1,t
P d1,t
W1,t
]− 1+θw
θw
+ ξw
[
Π¯
W1,t−1
W1,t
]− 1+θw
θw
∆w1,t−1. (A.21)
A.4 Production of Manufactured Goods
Intermediate variety producers introduce distinguishing characteristics into their out-
put. Competitive bundlers sell the manufactured good Y d1,t to households. It is
Y d1,t =
[∫ 1
0
Y1,t (i)
1
1+θp di
]1+θp
. (A.22)
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Given the distribution of prices, profit maximization of a bundler implies the demand
function for each intermediate variety to satisfy
Y1,t(i) =
[
P1,t(i)
P d1,t
]− 1+θp
θp
Y d1,t. (A.23)
The zero-profit condition yields that the price index is
P d1,t =
[∫ 1
0
P d1,t (i)
− 1
θp di
]−θp
. (A.24)
Under our baseline assumptions, the foreign currency price of exports is Pm2,t =
P d1,t/e1,t. Intermediate variety producers price their variety Y1,t(i) using contracts
as in Calvo (1983). Firms experience country-specific technology shocks z1,t
z1,t = ρ
zz1,t−1 + σ
zεz1,t. (A.25)
With linear technology,
Y1,t(i) = exp (z1,t)L
d
1,t(i), (A.26)
real marginal production costs, which are identical across firms, are given by
MC1,t
P d1,t
=
1
exp (z1,t)
W1,t
P d1,t
(A.27)
and the profit maximization problem is
max
P1,t(i),{Y1,t+j(i)}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
j=0
(ξp)jΛ1,t+j
(
(1 + τ p) Π¯jP1,t(i)−
W1,t+j
exp (z1,t+j)
)
Y1,t+j(i)
s.t.
Y1,t+j(i) =
[
P1,t+j(i)
P d1,t+j
]− 1+θp
θp
Y d1,t+j . (A.28)
The first order conditions from the intermediate producer’s maximization problem
imply that the price P d∗1,t set in the current period by all reoptimizing producers
satisfies
P d∗1,t
P d1,t
=
Hp1,t
Gp1,t
, (A.29)
with the definitions
Hp1,t =
P c1,t
P d
1,t
MU1,t
Et


∞∑
j=0
(ξpβ)j
MU1,t+j
P c
1,t+j
P d
1,t+j
1 + θp
θp
MC1,t+j
P d1,t+j
[(
Π¯
)j
P d1,t
P d1,t+j
]− 1+θp
θp
Y d1,t+j


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=
1 + θp
θp
MC1,t
P d1,t
Y d1,t + ξ
pβEt

MU1,t+1MU1,t
P c1,t
P d
1,t
P c
1,t+1
P d
1,t+1
(
Π¯P d1,t
P d1,t+1
)− 1+θp
θp
Hp1,t+1

 ,(A.30)
where Λ1,t+j = β
MU1,t+1
MU1,t
P c
1,t
P c
1,t+j
and
Gp1,t =
P c1,t
P d
1,t
MU1,t
Et


∞∑
j=0
(ξpβ)j
MU1,t+j
P c
1,t+j
P d
1,t+j
1 + τ p
θp
[(
Π¯
)j
P d1,t
P d1,t+j
]1− 1+θp
θp
Y d1,t+j


=
1 + τ p
θp
Y d1,t + ξ
pβEt

MU1,t+1MU1,t
P c1,t
P d
1,t
P c
1,t+1
P d
1,t+1
(
Π¯P d1,t
P d1,t+1
)1− 1+θp
θp
Gp1,t+1

 . (A.31)
The definition of the price index implies that
(1− ξp)
(
P d∗1,t
P d1,t
)−1
θp
+ ξp
(
Π¯
P d1,t−1
P d1,t
)−1
θp
= 1. (A.32)
The fact that output and labor are related via
∫ 1
0
Y1,t(h)
e
z1,t dh =
∫ 1
0
Ld1,t(h)dh = L
d
1,t
implies for the price dispersion measure ∆p1,t that
∆p1,t = (1− ξ
p)
(
P d∗1,t
P d1,t
)− 1+θp
θp
+ ξp
(
Π¯
P d1,t−1
P d1,t
)− 1+θp
θp
∆p1,t−1. (A.33)
A.5 Market Clearing
Aggregating over households, market clearing for the domestic good requires
Y d1,t = C
d
1,t +M2,t (A.34)
where M2,t denotes the demand of the foreign country for the domestic good. La-
bor and product market differentiation imply that the labor supplied by household
members is related to the output of the domestically produced good via
L1,t = ∆
w
1,t∆
p
1,t
Y dt
exp (z1,t)
. (A.35)
Combining the two conditions yields
exp (z1,t)L1,t = ∆
w
1,t∆
p
1,t
(
Cd1,t +M2,t
)
. (A.36)
Domestically traded bonds are in zero net supply, requiring D1,t+1|t = 0. For
internationally traded bonds, market clearing requires
B11,t +B21,t = 0, (A.37)
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B12,t +B22,t = 0. (A.38)
A.6 Useful Definitions and Simplifications
Under producer-currency-pricing, theory implies
δ1,t = ν1,t (A.39)
ν1,t =
1
ν2,t
. (A.40)
Defining the trade balance as
T1,t ≡ etP
m
2,tM2,t − P
m
1,tM1,t, (A.41)
we obtain the trade balance normalized by the value of exports as
T˜1,t =
T1,t
etP
m
2,tM2,t
= 1−
1− ωc1
1− ωc2

ωc1ν
1
ρc
1,t + (1− ω
c
1)
ωc2ν
1
ρc
2,t + (1− ω
c
2)


−(1+ρc)
δ1,t
C1,t
C2,t
. (A.42)
The optimal choices of the two bonds imply for country 1
P˜ b1,t ≡ (1− η)P
b
1,t + ηP
b
2,t = φ
b
1,tβEt
λ1,t+1
λ1,t
e1,t+1
e1,t
{
(1− η)
e1,t
e1,t+1
+ η
}
(A.43)
and for country 2
P˜ b2,t ≡ (1− η)P
b
1,t + ηP
b
2,t = φ
b
2,tβEt
λ2,t+1
λ2,t
{
(1− η)
e1,t
e1,t+1
+ η
}
, (A.44)
where by construction
P˜ b1,t = P˜
b
2,t. (A.45)
The budget constraint of the household can be rewritten to record the evolution
of the country’s NFA position
1
φb1,t
P˜ b2,tB˜1,t =
ν2,t−1
ν2,t
P d2,t−1M2,t−1
P d2,tM2,t
{
(1− η)
e1,t−1
e1,t
+ η
}
B˜1,t−1 + T˜1,t (A.46)
where we defined
B˜1,t =
e1,tB12,t
η
e1,tPm2,tM2,t
.
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The cost φb1,t is given by
φb1,t = exp
(
φb1B˜1,t
ν1,t
δ1,t
M2,t
Cd1,t +
ν1,t
δ1,t
M2,t
)
. (A.47)
We define the consumption-price based real exchange rate as
rer1,t =
(
F1,t
F2,t
)ρc
ν1,t
δ1,tν2,t
. (A.48)
A.7 Equilibrium Conditions for the Private Sector
For given sequences of the policy instruments set by the two policymakers, the en-
dogenous variables have to satisfy the first order and market clearing conditions
associated with the model laid out above. The full set of conditions describing the
equilibrium conditions of the private sector (compare also to Dynare codes) con-
sists of Equations (A.3), (A.5), (A.6), (A.7), (A.11), (A.12), (A.16), (A.17), (A.18),
(A.19), (A.20), (A.21), (A.27), (A.29), (A.30), (A.31), (A.32), (A.33), (A.36), (A.43),
(A.46), (A.47), for country 1 and their counterparts in the foreign country (not dis-
played) plus Equations (A.39), (A.40), (A.42), (A.45), (A.48). The exogenous shock
process for technology in country 1 is given by Equation (A.25). A similar equation
applies in country 2.
Let x˜t be the (N − 2) × 1 vector of endogenous variables excluding the policy
instruments. The exogenous shocks are summarized in the vector ζt. Then, assum-
ing that each country’s central bank uses one instrument only, denoted i1,t and i2,t
respectively, the N − 2 first order and market clearing conditions of the model are
summarized by
Etg(x˜t−1, x˜t, x˜t+1, i1,t, i2,t, ζt) = 0. (A.49)
A.8 Model Variants
This section of the appendix describes the model variants that allow us to consider
less-than-full passthrough of exchange rate movements to export prices, demand
shocks, and alternative arrangements for international financial markets.
A.8.1 Local- and Dominant-Currency-Pricing
Under local-currency-pricing, we have to split the pricing problem of the firm by
destination. The local-currency prices of the varieties are denoted by P d1,t(i) and
Pm1,t(i), respectively. The price indices
P d1,t =
[∫ 1
0
P d1,t (i)
−1
θp di
]−θp
, (A.50)
Pm1,t =
[∫ 1
0
Pm1,t (i)
−1
θp di
]−θp
(A.51)
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evolve according to
(1− ξp)
(
P d∗1,t
P d1,t
)−1
θp
+ ξp
(
Π¯
P d1,t−1
P d1,t
)−1
θp
= 1, (A.52)
(1− ξp)
(
Pm∗1,t
Pm1,t
)−1
θp
+ ξp
(
Π¯
ν1,t−1P
d
1,t−1
ν1,tP d1,t
)−1
θp
= 1 (A.53)
in country 1 and similarly in country 2. Prices of firms that do not adjust optimally
in the current period rise at the steady-state inflation rate of the country in which
the goods are sold.
In addition, we define the dispersion measures
∆d1,t =
∫ 1
0
[
P d1,t(i)
P d1,t
]− 1+θp
θp
di
= (1− ξp)
(
P d∗1,t
P d1,t
)− 1+θp
θp
+ ξp
(
Π¯
P d1,t−1
P d1,t
)− 1+θp
θp
∆d1,t−1 (A.54)
and
∆m1,t =
∫ 1
0
[
Pm1,t(i)
Pm1,t
]− 1+θp
θp
di
= (1− ξp)
(
Pm∗1,t
Pm1,t
)− 1+θp
θp
+ ξp
(
Π¯
Pm1,t−1
Pm1,t
)− 1+θp
θp
∆m1,t−1. (A.55)
We continue to assume that the producers of the differentiated intermediate va-
rieties purchase homogeneous input goods and differentiate them. The producers of
the homogeneous input good use labor only as before
Y1,t(h) = e
z1,tLd1,t(h). (A.56)
Aggregation implies ∫
Y1,t(h)
ez1,t
dh =
∫
Ld1,t(h)dh = L
d
1,t. (A.57)
Market clearing for the intermediate varieties requires∫
Y1,t(h)dh =
∫
Cd1,t(i)di+
1
ζ1
∫
M2,t(i)di. (A.58)
or
ez1,t
∆w1,t
L1,t = ∆
d
1,tC
d
1,t +
1
ζ1
∆m2,tM2,t. (A.59)
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The value of total sales for firm i in period t+ j is
S1,t+j(i) =
(
Π¯
)j
P d1,t(i)C
d
1,t(i) +
1
ζ1
et
(
Π¯
)j
Pm2,t(i)M2,t(i).
Expected discounted profits over the life-time of the given prices P d1,t(i) and P
m
2,t(i)
are
Et
∞∑
j=0
(ξp)j Λ1,t+j
{
(1 + τ p)S1,t+j(i)−MC1,t+j
(
Cd1,t+j(i) +
1
ζ1
M2,t+j(i)
)
.
}
The conditions for the pricing of the domestically sold goods are unchanged subject
to modifying the relevant demand driver from Y d1,t to C
d
1,t. Hence, it is
P d∗1,t
P d1,t
=
Hp1,t
Gp1,t
(A.60)
with the definitions
Hp1,t =
1 + θp
θp
MC1,t
P d1,t
Cd1,t + ξ
pβEt

MU1,t+1MU1,t
P c
1,t
P d
1,t
P c
1,t+1
P d
1,t+1
(
Π¯P d1,t
P d1,t+1
)− 1+θp
θp
Hp1,t+1

 ,
(A.61)
where Λ1,t+j = β
MU1,t+1
MU1,t
P c1,t
P c
1,t+j
Gp1,t =
1 + τ p
θp
Cd1,t + ξ
pβEt

MU1,t+1MU1,t
P c1,t
P d
1,t
P c
1,t+1
P d
1,t+1
(
Π¯P d1,t
P d1,t+1
)1− 1+θp
θp
Gp1,t+1

 .
(A.62)
The conditions for export pricing imply
Pm∗2,t
Pm2,t
=
MHp1,t
MGp1,t
(A.63)
with
MHp1,t =
P c1,t
P d
1,t
MU1,t
Et


∞∑
j=0
(ξpβ)j
MU1,t+j
P c
1,t+j
P d
1,t+j
1 + θp
θp
MC1,t+j
P d1,t+j
[
Π¯jPm2,t
Pm2,t+j
]− 1+θp
θp
M2,t+j


=
1 + θp
θp
MC1,t
P d1,t
M2,t + ξ
pβEt

MU1,t+1MU1,t
P c1,t
P d
1,t
P c
1,t+1
P d
1,t+1
(
Π¯P d2,t
P d2,t+1
)− 1+θp
θp
MHp1,t+1


(A.64)
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MGp1,t =
P c1,t
P d
1,t
MU1,t
Et


∞∑
j=0
(ξpβ)j
MU1,t+1
P c
1,t+j
P d
1,t+j
1 + τ p
θp
ν1,t+j
δ1,t+j
[
Π¯jPm2,t
Pm2,t+j
]1− 1+θp
θp
M2,t+j


=
1 + τ p
θp
ν1,t
δ1,t
M2,t + ξ
pβEt

MU1,t+1MU1,t
P c1,t
P d
1,t
P c
1,t+1
P d
1,t+1
(
Π¯P d2,t
P d2,t+1
)1− 1+θp
θp
MGp1,t+1

 .
(A.65)
Relative to the model with producer-currency-pricing, we newly introduce Equa-
tions (A.53), (A.55), (A.63), (A.64), (A.65), replace Equations (A.36), (A.30), (A.31)
with Equations (A.59), (A.61), (A.62), and remove Equations (A.39), (A.40). We
proceed analogously for country 2. Under dominant-currency-pricing, we make the
above adjustments for only one country.
A.8.2 Valuation Shocks
We model valuation shocks as in Albuquerque, Eichenbaum, Luo, and Rebelo (2016).
We implement the valuation shock in the home country ι1,t as follows
U1,t = Et
∞∑
j=0
ι1,t+jβ
j
{
ln (C1,t+j − κC1,t+j−1)−
χ0
1 + χ
L1+χ1,t+j
}
, (A.66)
with the growth of ι1,t following an auto-regressive process of order 1
ln
(
ι1,t
ι1,t−1
)
= ρι ln
(
ι1,t−1
ι1,t−2
)
+ σιει1,t. (A.67)
Consequently, the first order conditions of the household with respect to consumption
and labor in Equations (A.5) and (A.6) need to be augmented as follows
MU1,t =
(
ι1,t
1− κ
C1,t−1
C1,t
−
βκι1,t+1
C1,t+1
C1,t
− κ
)
1
C1,t
, (A.68)
W˜1,t
P d1,t
= ι1,tχ0,1
L
χ1
1,t
MU1,t
1
F ρ
c
1,t
. (A.69)
A.8.3 Complete Markets and Financial Autarchy
Under complete markets, we remove Equations (A.43), (A.46), (A.47), and their
equivalent expressions for the foreign country, as well as Equations (A.42), (A.45)
and newly introduce
MU1,t
MU2,t
= e0
λ1,0
λ2,0
P c1,t
P d
1,t
P c
2,t
P d
2,t
ν2,t
ν1,t
δ1,t =
1− ωc1
1− ωc2

ωc1ν
1
ρc
1,t + (1− ω
c
1)
ωc2ν
1
ρc
2,t + (1− ω
c
2)


−ρc
δ1,t, (A.70)
where e0
λ1,0
λ2,0
=
C2,0
C1,0
=
1−ωc1
1−ωc
2
.
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Under financial autarchy, we remove Equations (A.43), (A.46), (A.47), and their
equivalent expressions for the foreign country, as well as Equations (A.42), (A.45)
and newly introduce
C2,t
C1,t
=
1− ωc1
1− ωc2

ωc1ν
1
ρc
1,t + (1− ω
c
1)
ωc2ν
1
ρc
2,t + (1− ω
c
2)


−(1+ρc)
δ1,t. (A.71)
This condition is derived from the fact that trade is balanced at every point in time
under financial autarchy, i.e., δ1,tM1,t = M2,t.
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B Appendix: Consumption Equivalent Variation
Consider the utility functions of the two countries i = 1, 2, repeated for convenience
Ui,t = Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
{
ln (Ci,t+j − κCi,t+j−1)−
χ0
1 + χ
L1+χi,t+j
}
.
Define global conditional welfare to be Welft = ωU1,t + (1 − ω)U2,t. We denote by
Welf coopt the global welfare level attained under the cooperative equilibrium, and
by Welfnatt the global welfare level attained under the non-cooperative equilibrium.
For given paths of consumption and labor in the two countries, we are interested in
sizing a permanent subsidy τ applied to the consumption utility stream of country
1 such that the level of global welfare under the non-cooperative policies is equal to
the level of global welfare under the cooperative policies. Thus,
ωEt
∞∑
j=0
βj
{
ln
(
(1 + τ)
(
Cnat1,t+j − κC
nat
1,t+j−1
))
−
χ0
1 + χ1
(
Lnat1,t+j
)1+χ}
+ (1− ω)Et
∞∑
j=0
βj
{
ln
(
Cnat2,t+j − κC
nat
2,t+j−1
)
−
χ0
1 + χ
(
Lnat2,t+j
)1+χ}
= Welf coopt ,
which can be rewritten as
ω
1− β
log (1 + τ) + ωWelfnat1,t + (1− ω)Welf
nat
2,t =Welf
coop
t .
Rearranging terms, we obtain
τ = exp
(
1− β
ω
(
Welf coopt −Welf
nat
t
))
− 1.
Similarly, when considering country-specific outcomes, we compute country-specific
gains for choosing nationally-oriented policies over cooperation as
τ 1 = exp
(
(1− β)
(
Welfnat1,t −Welf
coop
1,t
))
− 1
τ 2 = exp
(
(1− β)
(
Welfnat2,t −Welf
coop
2,t
))
− 1.
Using a first order approximation, the following relationship holds
−τ = τ 1 +
1− ω
ω
τ 2,
between the global gains from cooperation τ and the country-specific gains from
nationally-oriented policies τ 1, τ 2.
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